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Relatively little attention has been paid to the issue of how individual regions will fare as a
consequence of the national decision on whether or not to adopt the single European
currency.  Regional welfare is influenced by both mean income and volatility. The present
paper focuses on volatility.  We develop a model of a regionally-integrated macroeconomy
to explore how the income variance implied by the national decision on EMU is distributed
across a  country's regions. The model suggests that weaker regions are likely to do better
than stronger regions with respect to volatility if the national economy participates in
EMU.
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1. Introduction
The costs and benefits of monetary union have been much debated in recent years, with
the income and volatility elements of the welfare analysis generally being treated
separately.
The early emphasis on the savings in currency transactions costs, for example, focuses on
the income element, as does the debate over whether monetary union will stimulate further
trade and investment; see e.g. Rose (2000).  The debate between the European
Commission (1990) and Krugman (1993), on the other hand  -  over whether national
production structures would converge or diverge as integration proceeded  -  is concerned
with the effects on volatility.  If production structures diverge with increased integration,
as Krugman argues, national shocks may become less symmetric, resulting in an increase
in the relative variance of national incomes. This would represent a negative effect, to be
balanced against possible positive effects arising elsewhere.
The present paper follows the literature in focussing on only one dimension of the welfare
effect  -  in our case the volatility of incomes.  Our point of departure is different however;
here we are concerned with the variance of sub-regions of a national economy. This issue
has largely been ignored so far.  The chapter on "Spatial Aspects" in the EU Commission
document, One Market, One Money (1990), that set the debate in motion does not even
address the implications of a change in monetary regime for regional variance.
Why should it make a difference whether one discusses national economies or sub-
regions?  This paper argues that different issues arise in the case of sub-national regions
because they cannot, even if the economy remains outside EMU, use monetary or
exchange-rate policy to offset the effects of shocks to which they are subject.
1
We address the following question: for regions within a particular country, what structural
differences determine how one region fares relative to another if the country maintains an2
independent exchange rate, and what bearing do these differences have on relative
performance if the country abandons its independent currency?
2   We take these regional
structural differences - in the composition of industry and degree of labour market
flexibility - as given.  In holding the composition of industry constant, we are clearly in the
realm of short-term macroeconomics: we have nothing to say about the longer-term
economic geography issues that motivate the Krugman-Commission debate.  Likewise in
holding the degree of labour-market flexibility constant we avoid the issue of whether and
how monetary union affects the incentive to engage in labour-market reform; Sibert
(1999), Sibert and Sutherland (2000).
There are two components to the question we ask; one is concerned with the types of
shocks that characterise each environment, and the other with differing  regional responses
to these shocks.  The latter is dealt with in the context of the theoretical model developed
in the next section of the paper.  From the outset however we need to take a view on the
types of shocks that are likely to be of most significance in each environment.
The first point to note is that the national decision on EMU (apart from the economic
geography effects that do not form part of the present analysis) has no bearing on the
virulence of, or response to, region-specific shocks, on the assumption that each region is
small relative to the national economy.  In this case region-specific shocks do not influence
national policy either inside or outside monetary union.
The same holds true for sector-specific shocks, unless the national economy is highly
specialised in particular sectors, in which case these become national shocks, to be dealt
with below.
                                                                                                                                           
1 It will be clear that regions are here assumed to be small relative to the size of the national economy.
2 Another way to view the motivation of the paper is to note that abandoning a policy instrument may lead
to increased instability but this may be required if benefits in terms of increased mean incomes are to be
captured.  If so, the cost is an increase in variance.  We are concerned with how this potential cost is
distributed across regions.3
Now consider exchange-rate shocks, on the assumption that there are three currencies of
importance: the national currency, the dollar and the euro.  Clearly, movements in the
euro-national exchange rate are possible only if the country remains outside EMU.  If the
economy participates in EMU on the other hand, dollar-euro exchange rate shocks will
have more virulent effects, if the alternative would have been to follow a middle course
between the euro and the dollar.
Which of these exchange-rate shocks is likely to be more important?  Our guess is that the
possibility of over- or under-valuation against the euro is likely to be more important than
of over- or under-valuation against the dollar, as all  EU countries trade more with the rest
of the EU than with the rest of the world; European Economy (2000).
3  Thus we view the
national economy as being more vulnerable to exchange rate shocks while outside EMU
(though this will not necessarily be the case for all regions, the implications of which can
easily be determined from the model).
Our characterisation of the "National Economy outside EMU" scenario assumes that these
exchange-rate shocks are the main types of shocks to which the economy is subject in that
environment.  The current strength of sterling, for example, provides a case in point.
The relative importance of asymmetric demand shocks inside and outside EMU is more
ambiguous. Outside EMU the country can use monetary policy in response, so the
significance of these shocks might be thought to be lessened in that scenario.  Many such
shocks appear to be policy driven, however, and with deeper policy harmonisation within
EMU these should decline in importance.
4   With the Krugman-Commission debate yet to
                                               
3 This does not prove the point of course.  Further suggestive evidence is provided by the Irish case
however, where US MNCs, many of which price in dollars, are of great significance.  Attempts to
construct a basket of “currencies of importance” to take account of this fact does not lead to the use of
weights very different from standard trade weights; Bartolini (1993).
4 Helg et al. (1995) find that more variance of output innovations to a local industry is explained by
country- rather than by industry principal components, suggesting that harmonisation of monetary and
fiscal policies may be more important than possible concentration effects, while Artis and Zhang (1997)
find EMS membership associated with more highly synchronised business cycles, suggesting that demand
shocks overall become more highly correlated across countries.4
reach a definitive conclusion, we must remain agnostic as to the implications of monetary
union for the virulence of demand shocks.
5
EMU participation is unlikely to synchronise asymmetric supply or productivity shocks to
the same extent however.
6   All the factors behind the current Irish boom for example
represent asymmetric supply shocks; Barry (2000).  These include convergence in
educational throughput and infrastructure, changes in the systems of industrial relations
and pay determination and an increase in the elasticity of FDI with respect to corporation-
tax rates.  Countries will obviously continue to differ in the pattern and extent of
technology shocks, and these impulses are mediated differently via differences in the
degree of product and labour-market regulation; Koedijk and Kremers (1996).
Since the real effects of supply-side shocks can be mitigated by exchange-rate movements
if nominal wages are at all sticky, as Bruno and Sachs (1985) show, the effects of such
shocks are projected to increase in intensity in our "National Economy in EMU" scenario.
To conclude, our outside-EMU scenario focuses on the regional effects of national over-
or under-valuation relative to the euro, while our inside-EMU scenario focuses on
economy-specific supply shocks where the possibility of an exchange-rate response has
been removed .
The next section of the paper develops a model of a regionally-linked economy with
regions differentiated in terms of industry mix and degree of labour-market flexibility.  The
following sections analyse the regional effects of the various shocks considered, and a final
section concludes.
                                               
5 De Grauwe (2000) makes the point with respect to the Krugman–Commission debate that with increased
integration industrial concentration will be more likely to straddle national borders. Thus  sectoral
demand shocks will remain distinct from economy-specific asymmetric demand shocks, reducing the
relevance of the exchange rate instrument.
6 While Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1993, 1994) find that supply shocks are more symmetric than demand
shocks they are not perfectly symmetric of course. Some increase in symmetry may arise however if
technology spillovers increase in range and speed as integration proceeds.5
2. A Two-Sector Model of a Regionally-Integrated Economy
2a.  Preliminary discussion
The national economy has two industrial sectors; one produces a traditional good T, with
recognisably-domestic characteristics, and the other a standard internationally-tradable
modern good, M, produced by an internationally-mobile industry.  There are two types of
labour - skilled and unskilled - while capital is fixed and sector specific.
The traditional sector comprises non-traded elements as well as low-technology
exportables. Writers in the macro tradition, such as Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995),
frequently model non-tradable as monopolistically competitive, while the recognisably
domestic characteristics we assume for the low-tech exportables allows us expand this
assumption of product differentiation to the entire T sector.  Thus the demand for this
good is downward sloping, and price is determined endogenously.
7
The modern good, M, on the other hand, is the product of a high-tech internationally-
mobile industry, in which the domestic economy is only one of a number of international
production locations.  The domestic economy is a price-taker with respect to this good,
whose price is set in euros on world markets.
The traditional good is produced using capital and less-skilled labour, while the modern
good is produced using capital and skilled labour.   The wages of skilled workers are
assumed to be perfectly flexible so that the market for skilled labour always clears, while
the wages of unskilled labour may be sticky, in which case employment of unskilled labour
will fluctuate.
                                               
7 In order to focus on inter-regional linkages and avoid the distraction of inter-regional price differences
we ignore regional non-traded goods, which one might think of as encompassing many services.  .6
Regions will be taken to differ across two dimensions: the mix of industries (T and M) that
they exhibit, and the degree of flexibility of their markets for unskilled labour.
What is the justification for these various assumptions?  Essentially we are equating the
modern sector with internationally mobile industry.  We do know that such industry is
more export-oriented than domestic industry.  For the 5 EU countries for which OECD
(1999) reports data, the export-output ratio is higher for foreign-owned than for domestic
firms in Ireland, the Netherlands, Finland and France.  It is clear from Griffith (1999) and
Gorg and Ruane (1999) that the same holds true for the UK.  Only in the Swedish case are
the shares equal.
We extrapolate from international tradability to price-taking behaviour.  Again this is
common in the macro literature.  We do not need to assume competition in the sector
however, simply that the price of modern-sector output is independent of conditions in any
one of its markets or production locations.
8
OECD (1999) shows that compensation per employee in foreign-owned manufacturing is
everywhere greater than in domestic industry.  Human-capital theory would read this as
support for our assumption on the different skill intensities in the two sectors.
Alternatively, one can focus on the specific sectors in which foreign-owned  industry is
located: in seven of the eight EU countries for which data is provided, employment and
value added in foreign-owned industry emerges disproportionately from high-tech and
high-skill sectors; OECD (1999).
9
                                               
8 Pavelin (2000) shows that the several hundred leading multinational firms in the EU produce on average
in more than 2 EU locations other than their home base.
9  The seven countries are the UK, Ireland, Germany, France, Italy, Finland and Sweden.  The
Netherlands proves an exception because of the size of its domestic electronics sector.  High-tech sectors
are as defined in OECD (1994).  High-skill sectors are so classified in terms of the proportion of
administrative, technical and clerical (ATC) staff in the labour force, and are as defined in Midelfart-
Knarvik et al. (2000).  See Griffith (1999) on the wages and ATC ratios of foreign-owned and domestic
industry in the UK.7
The justification for the assumption that the wages of skilled workers are much more
flexible than those of unskilled workers is that unemployment rates everywhere are much
lower for the former; Nickell and Bell (1996).
2b.  The Model
As mentioned above, the economy is a price taker in the market for good M, and the  price
is set in euros.  Domestic and foreign currency prices are related via the exchange rate
(defined as the price of foreign currency) as follows:
pm = e pm
*
With pm
*  exogenous we set it equal to unity, yielding:
(1)  pm = e.
Good M is produced under constant returns to scale, with a technology parameter A
which we will allow to vary later on.  With the stock of sector-specific capital held fixed,
employment (of skilled labour) is a function only of the productivity-adjusted real product
wage of skilled labour, ws/Ae.  Thus
(2) Ymi = Af(ws/Ae)
The skilled wage is completely flexible, so that full employment of skilled labour is
guaranteed.  Regional output of good M deviates from its initial level therefore only via a
shock to the technology parameter A.
10
The traditional T sector is modelled as  monopolistically competitive, with its price
determined endogenously.  As we will see, this allows us easily take the regional
dimension into account.  The relationship between the domestic and foreign price of good
T is also mediated via the exchange rate.  However, since the T sector produces a
differentiated product  the foreign currency price pt
*   (unlike pm
* ) is endogenous.
(3) pt = e pt
*
                                               
10 We want A to represent an equal shock to labour productivity in both sectors.  Perfect wage flexibility
for skilled labour leaves ws/Ae constant; the elasticity of both Ym and Ym/Lm with respect to A is therefore
unity.  We will see below that the elasticity of labour productivity to A in the T sector is also unity.8
World preferences over both goods can be described by a CES utility function:
(4)
where a is the elasticity of substitution and Cm and Ct represent consumption of each
good.
11
Since the T good is only produced in the home country, world consumption must equal
home country production.  Therefore we can write:
 (5) Yt = (pt/e)
-a  (j1/j2)
-a Ym
Here we write world demand for the T good as a function of world output of M. In fact
the only component of M production that matters for our analysis is home-country
production since rest-of-world production will be held constant.
12  Accordingly we will
henceforth let Ym denote home-country production of M.
The consumer price index, P, associated with this utility function is:
(6)
Output, Yt, of the traditional good  is a CES composite of intermediates produced in the
different regions of the national economy.  Since firms will be fixed both in number and in
location (due to the fixed capital stock, as seen below), we need not distinguish between
regions and (T-sector) firms.  Regions are subscripted i, and the output of the T sector in
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11 See Ferguson (1971) and Jehle and Reny  (1998) on the manipulation of CES functional forms.
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and
(9) Yti  =  (pti/pt)
-s Yt.
Thus regional intermediates are differentiated products whose prices can diverge
somewhat from each other.  We assume throughout that these regional components of the
T good are closer substitutes for each other than are the T and M goods; i.e. s > a.
We follow Lawrence and Spiller (1983) in assuming that fixed costs of production arise
from capital while variable costs stem from labour.  The total cost of production of the T
component produced in region i is:
(10) TCi = gri + w(b/A)Yti
where g is the amount of capital required to set up production, ri is the (endogenous)
rental rate on capital in region i, and A/b is the marginal and average product of labour in
this sector.
13  Note that here and henceforth an unsubscripted w refers to the wage of
unskilled labour.
 Each firm sets marginal cost equal to marginal revenue, to yield the mark-up pricing rule:
(11) pti = [sb/A(s-1)]wi.
With the number of firms fixed in the present short-run model, each firm's output level
responds to market demand so that:
and




                                                                                                                                           
12 While world consumption of T must equal home production, the country can run a trade surplus on this
good, which can be offset by an equivalent  gap between home production and consumption of M.
13 Monopolistic competition normally entails new firms entering until profits are bid down to zero.  In the
present model however, the number of firms in a region is constrained by the fixed stock of T-sector
capital: ni = Ki/g (which is set = 1).  Excess profitability induces current and potential firms to bid against
each other for the fixed stock of capital, however, which drives up the rental rate causing firms to expand10
In contrast to the skilled labour used in the M sector, whose wage flexibility guarantees
continuous full employment, the regional wages of the unskilled labour used in the T
sector can be sticky, and with some degree of regional immobility differential regional
unemployment rates can therefore appear.
14
The degree of nominal wage stickiness among the unskilled is measured relative to that
prevailing in the "average" region.  Note firstly that if the real productivity-adjusted wage
were constant everywhere, then employment would be constant with respect to our two
shocks.  We take this as our benchmark degree of flexibility.  The closer to zero is the
elasticity of the regional wage with respect to prices and productivity e(wi;AP), the greater
the degree of nominal wage stickiness in the region.  This elasticity will generally in our
analysis have a value of less than one.
 3.  Regional Effects of Exchange-Rate Shocks with the National Economy outside
EMU
We are interested in the impact of changes in e on the variance of regional income Yi
where
(13) Yi =  (pti/e) Yti + Ymi
To compute variance we use the delta method which shows that for a function Y = h(X),
the variance of Y can be approximated by {h'(E[X]}
2 Var (X); Johnson, Kotz and Kemp
(1992).  The variance of regional income in the present case is therefore:
Var (Yi)‰National economy outside EMU  =  (dYi/de)
 2 Var (e).
We therefore wish to compute the effect of a change in the exchange rate on regional
income.
                                                                                                                                           
production to cover the increase in fixed costs.  Formally Yti is as determined above and the zero-profit
condition yields an implicit value for the rental rate on the fixed stock of capital: Yti = (ri/wi)(g/b)(s-1).11
An exchange-rate change affects the price of the M good directly.  Because of wage
flexibility in this sector however the full impact of the exchange rate feeds into skilled
wages, and there are no output or employment effects.  The change in the nominal value
of M-output impacts on the T sector however.
Consider a region with an average degree of wage stickiness among unskilled workers; i.e.
where the elasticity of the regional wage with respect to the exchange rate  e(wi;e) is the
same as the average, e(w;e).  By (11) this implies e(pti;e) =  e( pt;e) =  e(w;e).  The impact
on regional output of the T sector will in this case depend only on changes in pt relative to
e, by equation (12).
For such a region, the elasticity of output with respect to the exchange rate is
(14) e( Yi ;e) = - [(pti/e)Yti/ Yi] (a-1) [e(wi;e)-1]
With perfect labour-market flexibility or real-wage rigidity throughout the entire economy
this would of course be zero, since nominal shocks have no real effects under these
circumstances.
15  With some stickiness however, the elasticity of the wage with respect to
the exchange rate (which is the elasticity with respect to the price level times the elasticity
of the price level with respect to the exchange rate) will be less than one, as both of its
components will be less than unity.  Since the elasticity of substitution, a, in
monopolistically-competitive models is greater than one, the elasticity of regional income
to the exchange rate is therefore positive. There is no surprise in this.  It simply says that a
devaluation in the presence of unemployment and wage stickiness draws excess labour
into production, and so output rises.
16
                                                                                                                                           
14 It will be clear that my definition of a region is an entity which does not control its own exchange rate,
rather than an entity characterised by perfect labour mobility. As is well known, interregional labour
migration is quite slow in Europe.
15 If only one region has real-wage rigidity however, while others do not, the pti for that region will rise
relative to pt raising the possibility of a fall in that region's income.  Many such interesting cases can be
explored within the model.
16 Note that in the present context this is undesirable, as we are concerned with minimising the variance of
regional output in the face of random shocks.12
Taking this "average region" as our benchmark we now wish to ask how the vulnerability
of regional income to exchange-rate shocks changes with the proportion of regional
income stemming from traditional industry, and with the degree of labour-market
stickiness.
To answer the first question we differentiate the elasticity, e( Yi ;e), with respect to the
proportion of regional income that stems from the traditional sector, (pti/e)Yti/ Yi.  From
(14) this is easily seen to be positive.  Since the modern sector is unaffected by this shock
while the traditional sector is, a larger traditional sector will increase the impact of the
shock and therefore raise the variance of regional income.
17
The second question is as easily answered.  Nominal wage stickiness implies that the
elasticity of wages with respect to technology and the price level; i.e. e(wi;AP), is close to
zero.  Again noting that  e(wi;e) in equation (14) is e(wi;AP) e(P; e), we find
(15) de(Yi ;e)/de(wi;AP) =  [(pti/e)Yti/ Yi] (1-a) [e(P;e)]       < 0
This result tells us a region with a marginally lower than average degree of wage stickiness
will find its level of income less vulnerable to exchange-rate shocks.  Again this is easy to
understand since increased labour-market flexibility reduces the difference in response of
the two sectors.
The conclusion from this section therefore is that if the country remains outside EMU the
variance of regional output will be higher for weaker regions, i.e. for those with a greater
share of the traditional sector in regional income and/or those with less flexible labour
markets.
                                               
17 Note that Baker, Fitz Gerald and Honohan (1996) find for the Irish case that traditional industries are
indeed more responsive to monetary shocks, whether of the exchange-rate or interest-rate variety.13
4. Regional Effects of Aggregate Supply-Side Shocks with the National Economy in
EMU
With the country in EMU exchange-rate shocks become less important.  Aggregate supply
shocks become more virulent however as they cannot now be compensated for by changes
in the exchange rate.  The aggregate nature of the supply-side shock imposed here is
represented by the fact that the impact on labour-productivity in the two sectors is the
same.
18
The variance of regional output in this case, with the country in EMU, is given by:
Var (Yi)‰National economy inside EMU  =  (dYi/dA)
 2 Var (A).
Hence we want to evaluate the elasticity of regional output with respect to the shock
parameter A.
The impact on the modern sector is straightforward.  With perfect wage flexibility of
skilled labour the skilled wage rises one-for-one with productivity, there is no change in
employment in this sector, and the output of M rises one-for-one with A, as seen in
equation (2).  The impact on the T sector is more complicated, with the chain of effects
running from productivity through wages to prices and demand.
The overall impact on the income of a region with average labour-market flexibility is:
(16) e( Yi ;A) =  1 - [(pti/e)Yti/ Yi] (a-1) e( pti ;A)
The mark-up pricing equation shows that
e( pti ;A) = e( wi ;A) -1, where
e( wi ;A) = e( wi ;AP)[ e(P ;A) + 1]
From these last two equations and the definition of the price index, the elasticity of the
latter with respect to productivity, e(P;A), is:
                                               
18 From the discussion following equation (2) it is clear that the elasticity of labour productivity in the M
sector with respect to A is unity.  From the specification of total costs of production in the T sector,
equation (10), labour productivity there is A/b, so the elasticity of labour productivity with respect to A is
again unity.14
- j2 pt 
1-a 
 [1-e( wi ;AP)] / {j1 pm 
1-a  +  j2 pt 
1-a 
 [1-e( wi ;AP)] }
whose value lies between zero and minus one.
Hence it is easily seen that the effect of a productivity shock on the regional wage wi is
positive but less than unity, and so the effect on the price of good T is negative.  In other
words, an adverse productivity shock reduces regional wages less than one-for-one, real
unit labour costs rise and the price of good T is driven up.
M sector output changes one-for-one with productivity, while T sector output changes
more than one-for-one. If there were perfect labour market flexibility across the entire
national economy, on the other hand, productivity would pass one-for-one through to
wages, leaving unit labour costs unchanged.  There would then be no price effects, and the
elasticity of regional output with respect to productivity would attain a value of unity.
19
Again we are interested in how the value of this elasticity, and hence the variance of
regional income, is influenced by the regional characteristics of interest; i.e. the share of
the traditional sector in regional income, and the degree of regional labour-market
flexibility.  We explore the first issue by differentiating equation (16) with respect to the
proportion of regional income that stems from the traditional sector, (pti/e)Yti/ Yi.  This is
easily seen to be positive, because the co-efficient on [(pti/e)Yti/ Yi] in (16) is greater than
unity while the co-efficient on  [Ymi/Yi] is one.  Thus a stronger share of the traditional
sector in regional income makes that region more vulnerable to supply-side shocks.
To find the impact of a marginally higher degree of labour market flexibility than average,
we differentiate (16) with respect to the indicator of labour-market flexibility e(wi;AP).
This is easily found as:
de(Yi ;A)/de(wi;AP) =  - [(pti/e)Yti/ Yi] (a-1) [ e(P ;A) + 1]     < 0
                                               
19 Once again however, interesting possibilities arise for regions with labour-market flexibility, if the
average is somewhat inflexible.  For such a region, the price of its T intermediate rises relative to the
average, raising the possibility that regional income will fall.15
Regional income rises more than one-for-one with a productivity shock because wage
stickiness allows more of the shock to be reflected in output and less in prices.  A lower
degree of wage stickiness (i.e. a higher value of the elasticity e(wi;AP) or greater labour-
market flexibility) will clearly reduce the output effects of the shock.
For the case of the national economy in EMU then, our results are qualitatively similar to
the case where the country remains outside.  The variance of regional output is higher for
regions which are weaker in terms of the two dimensions of the analysis: those with a
higher share of the traditional sector in regional income,  and those with less labour-
market flexibility.
5.  The Relative Effects on Weaker Regions of the National Decision on EMU
In the last two sections we have seen that both characteristics of weakness in a region, the
importance of the traditional sector in regional income and the degree of labour-market
inflexibility, increase the output effects of the shocks we looked at.  Thus weaker regions
are more vulnerable than stronger ones both outside and inside EMU.
It will be clear that we can say nothing about the absolute volatility of regional incomes
inside or outside EMU, as this will depend not just on the regional response elasticities but
also on the absolute variance of the shocks to which the regions will be subjected in the
two environments. This point seems to have been overlooked by Allsop, Davies and Vines
(1995) for example, who argued that because the regional stabilisation performed by
national governments within the EU is comparable to that which takes place in the US or
Canadian fiscal systems, there does not appear to be a need for a federalist system for
stabilisation within EMU.  This fails to note that the pressures placed on the system within
EMU could perhaps increase dramatically.
The main question which we are interested in addressing however still remains to be
answered.  This concerns the relative effects on stronger and weaker regions of the
national decision on EMU.   To answer this we need to look at the impact of regional16
characteristics on a region's vulnerability outside EMU relative to its vulnerability inside
EMU (where vulnerability is defined in terms of the response of regional output to the
relevant exogenous shocks).
We are concerned therefore with the effects of the regional characteristics of interest on
the quotient:
[Var (Yi)‰outside EMU]  /  [Var (Yi)‰inside EMU]
which we have argued is related to:
[(dYi/de)
 2 Var (e)] / [(dYi/dA)
 2 Var (A)]
From (16) and (14) it can easily be shown that for the benchmark case where all regions
have the same degree of labour-market flexibility,
d [(dYi /de)/(dYi/dA)]/d [(pti/e)Yti/ Yi]  > 0
and
d [(dYi /de)/(dYi/dA)]/de(wi; AP)  <  0
The first result tells us that a higher proportion of traditional industries makes a region
relatively more vulnerable to the type of shocks likely to dominate if the national economy
remains outside EMU.  The second result runs in the same direction, telling us that less
labour market flexibility will have the same effect.  Both results therefore imply that
regions that are weaker in terms of either characteristic are more vulnerable than average
if the national economy remains outside EMU.
As to why the effects of "regional weakness" are magnified for exchange-rate shocks
relative to labour-productivity shocks, the basic answer is that remaining outside EMU
(leaving the economy prone to exchange-rate shocks) raises the vulnerability of the weaker
sector only (and so impacts more strongly on weaker regions) while joining EMU raises
the vulnerability of both sectors (reducing the relative cost to weaker regions).17
6. Conclusions
Membership of EMU will change the nature of the shocks to which an economy will be
subjected.  For a country that does most of its trade with EMU countries, remaining
outside EMU will leave the economy vulnerable to under- or over-valuation against the
euro.  Joining EMU, on the other hand, will leave the economy more vulnerable to shocks
for which an exchange-rate change may be an appropriate response.  This paper explores
how different regions will fare relative to each other, in terms of the variance of regional
income, as a consequence of these changes.
According to the analysis, the type of shocks to which the economy will be subjected
outside EMU will impact primarily on the traditional sector. A strong currency means
wages, if inflexible, are set at uncompetitive rates.  The effects will show up particularly
strongly then in regions with less flexible labour markets.  These regions suffer a double
blow if traditional industry is of particular importance there, since the intermediates they
produce will not be priced competitively and they will lose demand to other regions.
Hence the effects of these shocks will show up particularly strongly in weaker regions.
The aggregate shocks to which the national economy will become more vulnerable within
EMU impact on both sectors, on the other hand, thereby diminishing the relative
vulnerability of weaker regions if the country participates in EMU.
The present paper therefore offers a new perspective on the importance of fiscal
federalism for monetary union.  Sala-i-Martin and Sachs (1992) made the point that
countries suffering asymmetric shocks will be better able to cope without the exchange
rate if a fiscal federalist system is in place.  Bayoumi and Masson (1995) and Allsop,
Davies and Vines (1995) responded that the regional stabilisation performed by national
governments within the EU is comparable to that which takes place in the US or Canadian
fiscal systems, suggesting that the need for fiscal federalism within EMU may be
overstated.18
The present paper makes two further points: one fairly obvious and the other substantive.
The first is that the variance of regional income may rise within EMU, if the variance of
the shocks in the policy-constrained environment are greater than the shocks cum policy
response outside EMU.  Thus the stabilisation burden on the existing fiscal system in
Europe may be increased.  It suggests that the conventional analogy with US states -
whereby fiscal federalism makes the option of running their own monetary policies less
desirable - is misleading.  A more appropriate analogy would be to ask whether monetary
union with the US would increase the fiscal-federalist burden of the Canadian government
with respect to the Canadian provinces or not.
The second point is the more substantive one.  It says that the variance of the weaker
regions, i.e. those with the higher variance to begin with, will fall relative to that of the
stronger regions, and in this sense the burden of stabilisation will be reduced.  It also
suggests that from the viewpoint of volatility alone, monetary union should be more
strongly supported in weaker than in stronger regions.
Finally we consider some issues that arise in thinking about empirically testing the present
model.  One difficulty is that a high share of output emanating from foreign multinationals
is treated in the paper as an identifier of a strong region.  However, it may not necessarily
signal a structurally sound region, if extra incentives have been offered to foreign firms to
locate in weaker regions.
A second set of issues arises in attempting to identify regional labour-market rigidities.  In
the model these are reflected in stronger employment swings amongst unskilled workers.
Empirically however it is probably reasonable to suppose that there is much greater wage
flexibility in the face of beneficial shocks than in the case of adverse ones.
20  If such
behaviour is associated with labour-market hysteresis, it might be reasonable to view
regional long-term unemployment as an indicator of this type of nominal stickiness; Barry
(1998).
                                               
20 This asymmetry is of course the basis of the assumed convexity of the short-run Phillips curve.19
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